

2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040002-5

JAN	FEB	MAR - 1970 -	APR	MAY	JUNE
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LAST MONTH	1970 FEBRUARY 1970	NEXT MONTH
1970 JANUARY 1970	1970 FEBRUARY 1970	1970 MARCH 1970
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A.M.	Friday	27	February	P.M.
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MEMORANDA

Record Briefings

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MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A-DD/S

27 February 1970

1. This was a short and relatively relaxed meeting.

2. Mr. Proctor reported on action initiated by him in connection with the problem of new weapons in [REDACTED]. As I understood it his exploratory moves included possible shift of the team of photographic interpreters from NPIC to USAFE on a temporary basis. The Director remarked that he believed this administration would go for a flight if a need for one is demonstrated.

25X1A

3. I reported very briefly that [REDACTED] negotiations seemed to be progressing satisfactorily and that Mr. Bannerman was planning to visit [REDACTED] for a couple of days returning to [REDACTED] for several days for the wrap-up of negotiations. The Director asked if this meant that Mr. Bannerman would likely to be back in about a week's time and I indicated affirmatively.

25X1A

4. Mr. Maury confirmed that the Director would take Mr. Duckett and Mr. Bruce Clarke with him to Monday's hearing before the Gore Committee and that Mr. Duckett and Mr. Chamberlain would accompany him to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee Hearing on Wednesday.

5. The Director instructed Mr. Maury in responding to a request from Mr. Woodruff of the Senate Committee Staff to be certain to clarify deliberate Agency use of contract personnel instead of staff personnel in areas and activities such as those now in [REDACTED]. His point is to have particular Appropriation Committee members of Congress understand that the Agency keeps its staff strength down and uses contract personnel who can be separated when projects and activities for which they have been hired are completed.

25X1A

6. Mr. Duckett reported that the visit of General Ryan, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force went very well.

~~SECRET~~

25X1A

7. Mr. Karamessines mentioned a commendation to the [REDACTED] and the Agency from the senior U. S. Navy officer in [REDACTED]

25X1A

8. Mr. Goodwin reported a query from NBC concerning a report of defoliation action of Air America in Cambodia. Mr. Goodwin had assured NBC that the Agency was not in the defoliation business anywhere. The Director wishes him to make clear that we are particularly not defoliating in Cambodia.

John [REDACTED] ey

25X1A

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

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25X1A

DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

27 February 1970



25X1A
25X1A

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Missing Pouch: Mr. Osborn advised today that OSI/USAF reported the non-arrival in [REDACTED] of one of two pouches sent via Pan American last November from [REDACTED]. In January 1970 some scraps related to the missing pouch had been found in a pond in the [REDACTED]. OSI was asking for Agency and specifically [REDACTED] assistance with [REDACTED]. The material which had been lost had to do with air reconnaissance in the [REDACTED]. O/S had instructed [REDACTED] to proceed to [REDACTED] and had assigned [REDACTED] to handle the Washington part of the problem. Mr. Osborn had informed Mr. Duckett and [REDACTED] of the event and the action.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

On 3 March I asked Mr. Osborn for a further report. He had nothing new but he said [REDACTED] was due in [REDACTED] 3 March. He further said that some Agency material may have been involved but no inventory of items included in the pouch was available.

25X1A

I mentioned this to Col. White by phone 3 March - he had had a basic report on 27 February but the fact that it concerned a loss in November 1969 had not been made known to him.

JWC:llc

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25X1A

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

B

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A-DD/S

25 February 1970

1. We had almost as many stand-ins as regulars - Mr. Houston is in Florida, Mr. Maury was on the Hill, Mr. Godfrey is traveling, Mr. Smith and Mr. Bross are absent, reasons unknown.

25X1A
25X1A

2. [REDACTED] reported the possibility of a coup attempt in [REDACTED] this weekend.

25X1A
25X1A
25X1A

3. [REDACTED] reported a request from the House Armed Services for figures on [REDACTED]. The Director instructed that this be cleared with [REDACTED] before any are provided.

25X1A

4. [REDACTED] quoted Mr. Maury's suggestion that he call on Senator Mathias. The Director reacted most positively to this idea, in a negative way, saying that he felt nothing could be farther from the desirable than this approach in view of yesterday's events. (See attached.)

25X1A

5. At the end of the meeting there was some further discussion of the unfortunate visit of newsmen to [REDACTED]. The Director's question was answered by Mr. Karamessines who said that [REDACTED] had cabled an explanation of what had happened. The cable stated that [REDACTED] to make arrangements to prevent newsmen who are going to [REDACTED]. He went on to say that apparently in the heat of the war the General had forgotten to do this. The Director was still annoyed at the fact that the several newsmen were able to get into a secret base and stay there for two hours before being challenged.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

6. [REDACTED] noted that a North Vietnamese VIP had coincided in Rangoon with U Thant leading to some speculation. The Director instructed that this story be reported.

7. The Director noted the Kraft article in today's Post and issued instructions that the real facts be assembled for him.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

25X1C



25X1A
25X1A

9. General Cushman said that he will be visiting DD/P and DD/I people in the course of his Friday and Saturday trip to [REDACTED] (I suggested to [REDACTED] that the DDCI consider visiting the Office of Security's [REDACTED] office as well.) The [REDACTED] office is already geared up to provide a vehicle and driver.

25X1A

25X1A

10. The Director noted several items from yesterday's 303 Committee Meeting:


25X1A

a. He had been asked to assume, and agreed to do so, responsibility for reporting the appearance of new weapons in [REDACTED]

25X1A

b. In that connection Col. ^BVG (?) Steakley was briefed on the possibility of using vehicles such as SR 71 and U-2 to spot new weapons. The Director was keeping very quiet when the Attorney General turned and asked whether the DCI didn't have a capability of flying the U-2 plane in [REDACTED] and the DCI agreed that it is a capability the Agency has. He said that he subsequently had spoken to General Ross about cranking up arrangements although not issuing any operation orders.

25X1C




John V. Coffey

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SENATORS ASSAIL POLICY OF NIXON ON WAR IN LAOS

**Mathias Says the Executive
Branch Flouts Congress
by U.S. Military Role**

SECRECY IS DEPLORED

**Mansfield, Gore and Cooper
Join in Attacks—White
House Shuns Comment**

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 25 — Criticism of the Administration's Laotian policy broke out in the Senate today as Senator Charles McC. Mathias, a freshman Republican from Maryland, charged that the Executive branch was subverting the will of Congress by the American military involvement in Laos.

Senator Mathias contended in a Senate speech that the Nixon Administration was turning Laos into "an arena for the repetition of the mistakes of our Vietnamese involvement."

His remarks touched off a round of criticism as Senators Mike Mansfield, the majority leader; Albert Gore, Democrat of Tennessee; Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri; John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois, joined in deploring Administration secrecy about what they generally described as a deepening American military involvement in Laos.

Officials Decline Comment

In response to press inquiries, spokesmen at the White House, State Department and Defense Department continued to refuse to describe the nature of American military activities in Laos or to discuss the United States involvement in the recent military operations around the strategic Plaine des Jarres in Northern Laos.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES - 26 February 1970

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Critics in the Senate Denounce

Nixon's Policy on Laotian War

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CPYRGHT

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

tory is now being described as a deteriorating situation by State Department officials.

The American military commitments in Laos, Senator Mathias said today, clearly "violate the spirit" of the National Commitments Resolution, approved by the Senate last year, which holds that specific Congressional approval should be required for every new commitment of American troops abroad.

'Dubious Disguises' Seen

He said it was also in conflict with an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act that sought to prohibit the use of American ground combat troops in Laos or Thailand.

As an example of the "dubious disguises" that he said were being used by the Administration, Senator Mathias pointed to reports that hundreds of former Army Special Forces troops, or "Green Berets," had been recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency to assist in clandestine military operations in support of the Laotian Government.

But indirectly the criticism also extended to Vietnam policy, for the question now being raised by Republican and Democratic critics is whether the Nixon policy of "Vietnamization" and withdrawal from Vietnam implies an escalation of military activity in Laos.

This was a point emphasized by Senator Mathias, who said: "It would be a cruel disappointment of President Nixon's hopes for peace if the success of Vietnamization in South Vietnam depends on escalation of the United States engagement in Laos."

"If that has become a new element of the conflict in Southeast Asia, then the American policy should be fully reappraised," he declared.

"For I believe that the American people—and the Congress—will not ultimately accept a withdrawal policy that entails merely a changing of uniforms and titles and a re-engagement in Laos."

Senator Mansfield, applauding the junior Republican for raising "the flag of warning," cautioned in similar vein that if the Laotian war continued to widen, then "all the plans for Vietnamization and all else will go down the drain, and we will find ourselves in a most difficult and dangerous situation."

Cooper Also Critical

Joining in the discussion, Senator Cooper observed: "I do not see how we are going to get out of that situation [in Vietnam] by getting involved in another war."

A key question implicit in this line of criticism is whether the Administration can ever resolve the conflict in Vietnam through its policy of Vietnamization — the gradual turning over of the burden of fighting to the South Vietnamese Government as United States forces are withdrawn.

The Administration, in seeking to explain the American military involvement in Laos, has argued that the hostilities in the two adjoining countries are related. If this is so, the critics are beginning to assert, then ultimately the only solution may lie in a negotiated settlement encompassing the entire region.

As a result, some Senators including Mr. Cooper, who until now have gone along with the Administration's Vietnamization approach, are returning to the argument that the objective

should be a negotiated settlement.

Senator Mansfield, for example, suggested that "one way out of the dilemma in which we find ourselves in Laos" would be to call for the assistance of Britain and the Soviet Union as the co-chairmen of the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos, at which accords were reached providing for the country's neutrality.

Today's Senate criticism provided increased pressure on the Administration to agree to publication of secret testimony taken last October by a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on American military involvement in Laos.

Publication Forbidden

The Administration has refused to permit publication of the testimony, and Senator Albert Gore, Democrat of Tennessee, in accusing the Administration of "misleading" the American public about the extent of the involvement, suggested that the reason was that the testimony would show that the United States was violating the 1962 accords.

Maintaining that there was little in the testimony that had not already been discussed in newspaper reports, Senator Mansfield joined in demands that the subcommittee record be made public. "If that report is not released shortly," he said, "it can only raise additional questions as to what we are doing in Laos."

Senator Stuart Symington, the chairman of the subcommittee, sent a letter today to Secretary of State William P. Rogers demanding that G. McMurtrie Godley, the United States Ambassador in Laos, be recalled for testimony. "In view of recent press reports of serious fighting in Laos and the difficulties which have been reported by press representatives in Laos in ascertaining the facts."

the view of Senate sources who have followed Laotian developments in detail, the Administration over-committed itself in the campaign last fall over the Plaine des Jarres.

The support of American planes and advisers was significant, according to these sources, as Royal Laotian troops captured the plain, which had been held at least in part for the last five years by pro-Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces.

Plain Recaptured by Foe

The 1969 campaign, according to these sources, was acclaimed by high-ranking State Department officials as an "important military victory." But these sources contend that the officials failed to recognize that the enemy forces were in a position to recapture the lost territory at any time.

Last week, under intensified attacks by the North Vietnamese, the Laotian Government troops were driven off the plain. As a result, what was initially acclaimed as a vic-

Continued on Page 10, Column 1

U.S. Force in Laos Stirs Senate Anger

Breach of Hill's Intent Seen

By Warren Unna

Washington Post Staff Writer

Communist Forces Regroup

By Jack Foisie

Los Angeles Times

CPYRGHT

Angry senators jumped on the administration yesterday after reading eyewitness news accounts reporting that armed Americans in civilian garb and American-supplied bombing planes are being involved in the war in Laos.

"Laos has become an arena for the repetition of the mistakes of our Vietnamese involvement," declared Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) in a speech on the Senate floor.

"I believe that the American people—and the Congress—will not ultimately accept a withdrawal policy (from Vietnam) that entails merely a changing of uniforms and titles and a re-engagement in Laos."

Mathias said the U.S. activities in Laos would appear to "clearly violate the spirit" of two congressional actions last year: the "National Commitments Resolution," requiring specific congressional approval for every new engagement of American troops abroad; and the Cooper-Church amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act—blessed by the Nixon administration—which prohibits funding of any U.S. ground combat troops in either Laos or Thailand.

"Can the reservation of war powers to the Congress be circumvented by redesignating soldiers as agents of the CIA or as military advisers?" Mathias asked.

See DEBATE, A18, Col. 1

VIENTIANE, Feb. 25—North Vietnamese troops, moving faster than in any previous dry-season offensive in northern Laos, appeared to be regrouping today after capturing the important allied airport and town of Muong Soui, 15 miles west of the Plain of Jars.

Their speedy advance came despite increased use of American air power against them.

Their next push west is expected to be along Route 7 to where it joins Route 13, a distance of 35 miles from Muong Soui through mountainous country.

Controlling this key road junction would seal off road traffic to Luang Prabang, the

royal capital 50 miles to the north.

So far the enemy advance is along the same axis as their push into royal Lao territory last year.

With the occupation of Muong Soui last night, the tank-supported Communist units have advanced 35 miles across the strategic Plain of Jars in three days.

Their larger units appear to be moving mainly at night to avoid detection from the air and subsequent bombing. Enemy forces have been estimated at between 6,000 and 10,000 men, belonging to the 312th and 316th regular North Vietnamese army divisions.

See LAOS, A18, Col. 3

U.S. Force in Laos Stirs Senate Anger

DEBATE, From A1

"It would be a cruel disappointment of President Nixon's hopes for peace if success of vietnamization of south Vietnam depend on the escalation of U.S. engagement in Laos," Mathias warned.

Another Republican, Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, promised to tack amendments onto all future defense appropriations bills to extend the earlier congressional stricture against U.S. ground combat troops to "air, naval and civilian forces."

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) released a letter he had written to Secretary of State William P. Rogers requesting that Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley be summoned home "as soon as possible" to give the facts to his Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) delivered a scorching rebuke to Godley from the Senate floor after reading press accounts. These quoted Godley as having declared that the Embassy had "lost interest in helping out the press" after three newsmen had been seized by Lao troops for looking into secret areas.

Mansfield said that the fact that Laos has not yet become another Vietnam "may well be due to the persistent effort of the American press."

He praised the reporters in Laos for having "penetrated the veil of vague policy in

which this involvement has been wrapped for too many years."

The State Department later announced that Godley had been cabled for comment and declared he had never made such a statement. Now State is trying to find out whether an Embassy spokesman may have made it in the ambassador's behalf.

The three newsmen, representing The New York Times, Life magazine and a foreign news agency, had left a U.S.-guided tour of an innocuous area and gone on their own to the long-secret base of Long Cheng to see what actually was going on.


They hitch-hiked, avoiding two Lao roadblocks, and arrived at the base to report American-made planes taking off at the rate of one a minute. Presumably, the planes were to support the Royal Lao government in its fight against the North Vietnamese and Communist Pathet Lao insurgents.

After two hours, the newsmen were arrested by a Royal Lao colonel, interrogated by an American in civilian clothes—presumably CIA—and hustled out at U.S. Embassy direction on a plane bound for Vietnam, the Lao-tian capital.

State Department officials said yesterday that the only reason the three correspondents were back safe in Vientiane was that the U.S. Embassy took the initiative in flying them out of the forbidden Long Cheng base.

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A18 Thursday, Feb. 26, 1970 THE WASHINGTON POST

N. Viets Regroup After Taking Tow

LAOS, From A1

Muong Soui itself is in rubble, having been fought over three times within the past year. The enemy took it in June, gave it up in September, and now have it again.

The government troops of Gen. Vang Pao in Muong Soui at the end numbered less than 100 men and withdrew at his order after dark following a day of sporadic fighting and failure of a relief column to reach them.

Like so much of the recent action, details are obscure as to casualties. Even American advisers with Vang Pao were not aware that Muong Soui had fallen until this morning.

The object is to reduce American "accidental" losses on the ground and avoid new ammunition for those concerned over the increasing American involvement in Laos—mainly air involvement through its Thailand-based bomber fleet.

An embassy spokesman said only 36 Americans had been killed in connection with the ground war since 1962.

However, bomber-crew losses have sharply increased in the past two months. This was indicated in an American embassy report listing 184 American air crewmen now missing, an increase of almost 30 since the last report issued in December 1969.

The list is furnished to the Communist Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane in hopes that he will provide information on whether they are dead or being held prisoner.

So far no information has come from the Pathet Lao about the missing Americans. There is speculation that the enemy may not push further west than Muong Soui, but instead will turn south from the Plain of Jans and harass the two airfields of the latter being Vang Pao's headquarters.

In a pullback from the southern rim of the plain, Vang Pao today withdrew his defenders from the town of Xieng Khouang, equally in trouble. Troops withdrew to blocking positions against possible infiltration of enemy units towards Sam Thong and Long Chen.

The ranking American official in Sam Thong is Edgar (Pop) Buell, who has been in the region for ten years. Buell concedes that Sam Thong is vulnerable. Like other Ameri-

cans at Sam Thong, he said: "I sleep with my clothes on at night."

Thai Premier Says Reds Threaten Border

Reuters

Premier Thanom Kittakachorn of Thailand said yesterday a column of Pathet Lao troops was approaching the Mekong River town of Pak-Sane on the border with Thailand.

Thailand had made preparations for defending its border of provinces, Thanom told news-men after Thai leaders met with American Ambassador Leonard Unger at armed forces headquarters in Bangkok.

Official sources in Bangkok said the government placed all the border provinces with Laos on a full alert. In Vientiane, American Am-

bassador G. McMurtre was called to a top-level meeting to discuss the situation. The ambassador declined comment when he returned from a meeting with Premier Souvanna Phou.

The State Department yesterday that a serious situation had developed in it was still uncertain whether North Vietnamese objectives were.

A call to end the fighting of the International Commission set up in 1961 under an international treaty and peace to Laos. Indian External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh said New Delhi that Laos had posed a special "Geneva conference" in an attempt to settle its fight against Vietnamese infiltrators.

February 26, 1970

By Jos. P. Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

CPYRGHT

THE WASHINGTON POST - 26 February 1970

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Joseph Kraft

U.S., Russia Appear to Be Using Their ABM Programs as Chips

RECENT developments on both sides suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States are now deliberately manipulating their Anti-Ballistic Missile programs as chips for a bargain on arms control.

But is following the ABM track a plausible way to achieve disarmament? Or is it just another Strangelovian misconception sure to end in still another tragic denouement?

On the Soviet side, the new development concerns the changing evaluation put on the Galosh ABM system which the Russians have deployed around Moscow. Back in 1965, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky staked a high claim for the Galosh. In an Armed Forces Day statement, he said it was "capable of destroying any ballistic rocket of any aggressor at an immense distance from the installations defended."

This claim was subsequently downgraded. In 1966, Marshal Malinovsky rated the system only capable of destroying "any aircraft and many kinds of missiles." And that same "any aircraft and many kinds of missiles" formula was used by Marshal Andrei Grechko in an Armed Forces Day statement in 1967.

This year Marshal Grechko, now Defense Minister, revived almost word for word, the claim staked by Marshal Malinovsky back in 1965. In an article commemorating Armed Forces Day Marshal Grechko said: "We possess weapons capable of reliably hitting enemy aircraft and missiles irrespective of their flight, at great distances from the defended targets."

That last statement is interpreted by the Kremlinologists as a move in arms control negotiations for many reasons. Because it was staked by Marshal Malinovsky back in 1965, it is not

thought to be a bid to get more money for defense. Nor does it have a missile-rattling sound, apt to offend this country.

AT THE SAME time, by raising the value of the present Soviet system, it enables Moscow to ask a big American concession in return for any decision by the Russians to stop their ABM development at present levels. Such a move is supposed to fit perfectly into the pattern of arms control negotiations established in the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki last fall.

On the American side, the latest developments turn on the public rationale offered by the Nixon administration for the on-going ABM program in this country. At his press conference of Jan. 30, President Nixon seemed to emphasize the need to build a system capable of defending American cities against a possible Chinese threat.

The President specifically cited the Chinese, and spoke of the danger of "nuclear blackmail" for the next decade. He indicated that a defense of the cities against the Chinese was "absolutely essential." And he said that the hardware required for such a defense had been developed to the point where it as "virtually infallible."

THAT STATEMENT shocked and confused many knowledgeable officials in and out of the administration. It was pointed out to the President that going for an anti-Chinese system would probably compromise any deal with the Russians. At a minimum, the already complicated negotiations would be further complicated by the addition of third-party considerations. Moreover, getting hooked on an anti-Chinese system meant a commitment to a long-term program of great expense that would be directed against the Soviet

Union. With such a program underway anyhow, the Russians would have no possibility of halting American ABM development by an agreement in the SALT negotiations.

The President apparently harkened to these arguments. The proposal for a second-phase ABM announced by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird on Tuesday de-emphasizes the Chinese rationale. Instead of pushing towards protection of cities against an eventual Chinese threat, it concentrates on protection of missile sites against a present Soviet capability. The move toward further protection of the missile sites is taken in a phased way that can obviously be suspended if the arms control talks succeed. Thus the Russians are given, in the most visible way, an added motive for pushing ahead with the disarmament negotiations.

But can this approach to disarmament really work? Isn't it so complicated, so heavy with fanciful scenarios and so vulnerable to the vagaries of internal politics, that it is bound to go awry? Isn't it a sure prescription for escalating, first, ambiguity, next mistrust, and, finally, the arms race once again? Isn't it, indeed, the kind of eyewash dedicated armorers always hand out before going ahead in the next stage of weapons development?

The answer is that it is hard to know. The one clear point at this juncture is that we need far more information—especially about the President's curious performance in the Jan. 30 press conference. And it is probably not a good idea for anybody to make up their minds about the second phase of ABM until we have had the searching hearings promised by Senator Albert Schweitzer of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

26 February 1970


Per Col White

GSI: Mr. John Dillon who is successor to Mr. Ayers in GSI has no restaurant experience. Mr. Bill Smith the Vice Chairman of the Board, GSI, is also the Commissioner of Public Buildings and is one of the protectors of GSI in any GSA-GSI matters.

JWC:llc

*Extract to D/L

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Wednesday

25

February

A.M.

P.M.

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12:45	5:00

MEMORANDA

Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040002-5

DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

25 February 1970

1. Meeting with Col. White: Today I met with Col. White on the following points:

25X1A

I gave him the package which included Admiral Harlfinger's letter plus a draft response which we had prepared for the Executive Director's signature (in lieu of DDCI or DCI). Col. White had no problem with the idea of his signing the letter but said that he wanted to inform the Director of the request and of the proposed action before releasing a formal response.


b. I also took back to him with an oral explanation the Director of Personnel's semi-annual updating of places and time periods of award of the Certificate of Exceptional Service - this had been returned to us by Col. White with a request for clarification. After discussion he signed for the Director and agreed to the idea of which we had already hit upon of changing the format in the next report to isolate more clearly those points of change during the six-month period upon which the report was based.

25X1A

or crisis, together with amplifying paperwork produced by D/CO. After some discussion Col. White agreed that we should proceed as planned and penned a note on our original paper which included the point that Mr. Proctor would have to re-enter the picture should the arena change from the technical to the substantive.

SECRET

25X1A



25X1A

e. * A. [REDACTED] Col. White has asked that we discuss with him your note to the effect that we could block travel. I had obtained information from the Office of Security concerning completion of the resignation action, the passport situation, and the manner in which "blocking" could be accomplished. The passport situation shows that

25X1A

[REDACTED] has in his possession a tourist passport and that his wife has his original official passport (it was not lost as he reported while overseas in applying for his second official passport). The second official passport was picked up during his out processing. The first official passport is to be reclaimed from the wife but only after she is informed of his plans. On the "blocking" [REDACTED] of CI assured the Office of Security that we could arrange for the [REDACTED] to issue instructions which would prevent his being granted admission at any border point and which should be effective precluding his being issued a visa by any [REDACTED] official. Col. White said that while the Director does not want him to travel to [REDACTED] he is very sensitive to interfering with [REDACTED] as a private citizen. The Director desired that we ask State Department not to help obtain a visa

25X1A
25X1A

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25X1A

SECRET

SECRET

and let us know if any application is made. (Col. White and I agreed that State would not know if he applied for a visa since the application would be made as a private citizen to the [REDACTED] Embassy or Consulate.) Col. White asked if we could obtain more information about the documentation of the Vietnamese including what U. S. agency would be involved with any application for extension of permission to remain in the U. S. - this is probably the place at which the State Department could help. We were also to explore with [REDACTED] the manner in which we can seek [REDACTED] assistance locally to let us know should [REDACTED] apply for a visa to return to [REDACTED] - to see what "points" we would have to use in order to set up such an arrangement.

25X1A

25X1A
25X1A

25X1A
25X1A

JWC:llc

*Extract to D/S

SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

B

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A/DD/S

25 February 1970

1. This was a very quick meeting since the Director announced that he had to go to an early committee meeting. Mr. Proctor represented DD/I. [REDACTED] sat in for Mr. Bross and [REDACTED] represented [REDACTED] who was at [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] mentioned that [REDACTED] had written to him about joining a trip to [REDACTED] and asking if this would cause any problems. The Director noted that [REDACTED] holds "all the clearances" and told [REDACTED] to get in touch with O/S to be sure that the decision is made in accordance with all the rules.

3. Mr. Maury noted that the [REDACTED] officer who recently defected is to be surfaced with the House Internal Security Committee. It is understood that the Committee and the man himself have agreed that Agency connections will not be surfaced.

4. Mr. Duckett noted that Mr. Brandwein's presence at the first meeting of the new Safeguard Committee indicated that this would be a payoff representation.

5. Mr. Duckett noted that he had yesterday briefed former Governor Dewey in connection with the variety of special clearances. Apparently Governor Dewey and General Clay are to be private sector consultants to the administration on disarmament.

6. General Cushman announced that the NIRB Meeting last week reached agreement on a NSA contribution which constituted all that NSA could provide even though it was only about half of what was desired.

7. The Director announced with warm congratulations that Mr. Houston would receive the National Civil Service League Award for 1970.

John [REDACTED] ey

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

25X1A




DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

25 February 1970


25X1A



Agency Movie: Approved revised and improved "Need To Know" - small adjustments, cleaned up sound track, etc. All present agreed 

25X1A

25X1A

 will have other copies conformed.

JWC:llc

SECRET



SECRET

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25X1A



DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S

25 February 1970

25X1A

1. Longevity Awards: [REDACTED] raised the question of presentation or no presentation to DD/S staff personnel of longevity certificates which were won during their absence from headquarters and which have been filed in the interim. He had two examples in hand, 10 and 15 year certificates for [REDACTED] and himself. We agreed that since these could not be at this time taken home and since the awardees would be eligible shortly for another certificate to place these in their soft files. DD/S may wish to change this.

25X1A

2. Voluntary Investment Program: I advised Col. White that the Board of Trustees had decided not to change the name of the investment plan but rather to stay with "Voluntary Investment Program - VIP".

JWC:llc

SECRET



Case# 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP78-00027R000100040002-5

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1970	FEBRUARY							1970
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NEXT MONTH							
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24

February

P.M.

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MEMORANDA

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

B

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A/DD/S

24 February 1970

1. General Cushman, Mr. Bross and Mr. Duckett were absent. (I gathered that Mr. Duckett's daughter had to be taken in for some hospital consultation.) Mr. Houston was back after his sick leave.

2. DD/I handed the Director the NSC schedule for this week but noted his belief that NSC would probably not meet on Thursday. DD/I went on to say that at the Review Group Meeting on 23 February it was apparent that the agenda item for Thursday was really not ready.

3. DD/I also reported the untimely death of [REDACTED] 48 years old, OCI bright star from a heart attack on 23 February. The Director asked that the DD/I draft for him a letter to [REDACTED] (After the meeting I informed Mr. Wattles and asked that he have his people coordinate with DD/I to draft the letter so that the O/P machinery did not routinely produce a second letter. *this done + letter prepared*)

25X1A

25X1A

4. The Director noted his understanding that Ambassador Thompson was to be operated on today in Georgetown Hospital. He asked [REDACTED] to check on Ambassador Thompson and to get Dr. Tietjen into the act. [REDACTED] accepted my offer to contact Dr. Tietjen in this regard. In Dr. Tietjen's absence I talked to [REDACTED] and enlisted OMS assistance. Later [REDACTED] telephoned to advised that [REDACTED] had had word that the operation had gone well, which [REDACTED] had passed to Dr. Tietjen who in turn told him that OMS's inquiry had produced the same information. Dr. Tietjen somewhat later informed me that Mrs. Thompson had called [REDACTED] Dr. Tietjen also noted that the private surgeon was Dr. Robert Coffey, ex-professor of surgery at Georgetown Hospital. Finally, Dr. Tietjen said that if no complications arise Ambassador Thompson might return to duty in about 30 days.)


25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

5. Mr. Maury reported that last Friday's briefings for Messrs. [REDACTED] had apparently been satisfactory.

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

6. Mr. Maury also noted that the Director is to appear before Senator Gore's group on 2 March and the Joint Committee (Atomic Energy?) on 4 March.

25X1A

7. [REDACTED] reported that Assistant Secretary Froehlke and Admiral Gaylor are coming to the Agency for briefings today preparatory to their travel. (Apparently Mr. Froehlke had been out last Friday for a private briefing in the same connection.)

25X1A

8. [REDACTED] also reported a potential flap which developed in the NIRB Meeting when a pair of senior NSA officers appeared uninvited and were ultimately asked by General Cushman to depart.

9. The Director noted that the President is extremely interested in learning more about the Swiss Air accident and explosion. He asked all concerned to be sensitive to this interest and he approved Mr. Houston's idea of tapping informally the International Airline Pilots Association in this connection.

10. The Director mentioned yesterday's two hour NSC Meeting and noted that the President is interested in having the March NSC Meeting already identified for Greece and Turkey turned into a comprehensive review of the full Mediterranean area. The President apparently noted that three different bureaus in the Department of State were involved in the Mediterranean countries.

11. The Director announced that a new committee has been formed in connection with the Safeguard Missile Program. This committee is apparently designed to attempt to ensure that the Executive Department will speak with a single voice. Apparently SecDef Laird reached and took this one from the White House staff and in turn designated DDRA Foster as the Chairman. The Director is ~~normally~~ the CIA member but after discussion at the meeting it was agreed that Mr. Brandwein would sit in for him. (The Director had had in mind that Mr. Maury might do the job but this was opposed by DD/I and A/DD/S&T.)

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~


SECRET EYES ONLY

12. The Director announced the existence of NSDM No. 40 which is a rewrite of NSC 54-12/2, the 20-year old document on Covert Action. Apparently the 303 Committee will now become the 40 Committee. The Director expressed the desire to hold existence and content of the NSDM "inviolable" although he acknowledged that it was unfortunate that the designation as "40 Committee" was already on paper and in use.

John [REDACTED] ey

25X1A

SECRET EYES ONLY



SECRET

25X1A

B



DIARY NOTES

A-DD/S


24 February 1970

Broken Fan Pulley: LSD reported that the pulley on a fan serving the G Corridor (2 to 6 floors) had broken on Sunday and that despite GSA efforts on Monday no replacement had been located. This meant that for at least most of the day offices in G Corridor would be without air circulation. LSD was advising administrative officers concerned and I asked them to be sure to tell [REDACTED] Before the Morning Meeting I privately told DD/I and the Executive Director of this matter but did not otherwise announce it. On 25 February we learned that replacement was accomplished about 0130.

25X1A

JWC:llc

SECRET



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JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
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LAST MONTH	1970	JANUARY	1970	1970	FEBRUARY	1970	1970	MARCH	1970
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Friday 20 February
A.M. Saturday Duty P.M.

25X1A

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MEMORANDA DCE Duty - Coffey

AL - [REDACTED]

25X1A

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LAST MONTH	1970 FEBRUARY 1970	NEXT MONTH
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A.M.	Sat. - Sun.	21-22	February	P.M.
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MEMORANDA

JAN	MAR - 1970 - APR	MAY	JUNE
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LAST MONTH	1970 FEBRUARY 1970	NEXT MONTH
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Monday

23

February

A.M.

P.M.

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MEMORANDA

Holiday - Washington's Birthday

25X1A

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EYES ONLY
SECRET

B

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A/DD/S

20 February 1970

1. The Director, and therefore the tone of the meeting, was quite relaxed.
2. The DD/I announced that there would be a NSC Meeting at 1100 Monday. (I learned subsequently that there is also scheduled a NSC Review Group Meeting for 3:30 Monday.)
3. The DD/I reported that he hoped to have completed a paper summarizing reactions world-wide to the President's 18 January message.
4. Mr. Godfrey noted that he was off on his round the world trip tomorrow. (He is going to [REDACTED]) The Director made what I would gather to be a serious point although lightly that he wishes senior travelers to report in occasionally while enroute rather than waiting until they return and some weeks later submitting a trip report.
5. I reported the two week FEPA grace period and also the "Watergate", noting that Security would gear up on Saturday as required by the situation. The Director asked for clarification on what was suppose to happen Saturday and I told him of the reported vague planning for moves to the Central Detention Block, to the Main District Police Headquarters and to the Justice Department. The Director asked that someone quietly pass the word to Walter Pforzheimier to lower his profile in this and related matters.
6. Mr. Maury noted a talk by Representative Frelinghuysen to the Midcareerists yesterday, in which the Congressman pointed out that Congress is completely in the dark as to what has happened.
7. The DDCI reported that there was to be an NIRB Meeting today. He indicated that there had been some what of a break through with NSA in terms of cooperation and provision of data.

25X1A

SECRET
EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
downgrading and
declassification

EYES ONLY
SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/05/05 : CIA-RDP73-00027R000100040002-5

8. Executive Director noted that Monday as a National holiday would be treated as a Sunday unless the Director desired otherwise, which he did not.

9. The Director noted a piece in yesterday's New York Times which included a chart of the National Security Council setup. He asked the DD/I to do something like this for internal use. *ATTACHED*

25X1A

JOHN [REDACTED] FFEY

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SECRET
EYES ONLY

Security 'Wonderful' For Watergate Area

By Myra MacPherson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Mrs. James Nicoll, hugging her Yorkshire terrier, looked from her Watergate East apartment window at a sea of white-helmeted policemen yesterday afternoon.

"When I see those police all lined up in those beautiful white helmets, protecting us—well, it's just wonderful to know how well protected we really are," she said.

Mrs. Nicoll could see no demonstrators from her front apartment because hundreds of policemen kept the protesters a long city block away.

In fact, the Watergate complex—the luxury high rise, fashionable enclave of high-level Republicans—was under siege, not by demonstrators, but by police, plainclothesmen and the Watergate security committee.

Police stood on roofs and lined the north lobbies, which leads to the apartments of Attorney General John N. Mitchell, President Nixon's private secretary Rose Mary Woods, Secretary of Transportation John Volpe.

Blue-coated apartment managers stopped anyone heading

for the elevators who did not have a familiar face.

Residents in general heeded a warning memo sent by O. P. Easterwood Jr., president of Watergate East, requesting that they stay in their apartments if at home and "not attempt to watch the proceedings from the lobby or outside. If you try to come down, it will only hamper the efforts of the police and furnish material for the news media."

One woman on her way through the lobby said, "I went out in the morning to stock up with food at the Safeway. I thought they might loot that."

Another woman with a ground-floor apartment said, "I took some wooden things off my balcony in case they threw fire bombs. I pictured them climbing over my balcony."

As a woman in a bandana and slacks stood undisturbed by police in an island in the middle of the street, sketching the scene, one Watergate resident was being told to go upstairs to her apartment by another resident.

The owner, Walter R. Ford, chairman of the security

committee for Watergate East, was smoking a pipe, wearing an American flag in his lapel button hole and a walkie talkie at his hip. He said he was "in charge of this thing for Watergate." He was having trouble with the woman, who was unimpressed.

"When the police tell me to go, I'll go." A young policeman nearby looked as if the last thing he wanted to do was send her anywhere.

The Watergate complex is serviced by a mall containing beauty salons, flower shops, liquor stores, drug stores and supermarkets. They were all virtually empty. A clerk yawned in the nearly deserted drugstore and read a magazine.

Over in the Watergate hotel bar and restaurant, the feeling was festive.

George, the maitre de, said, "I showed three ladies a short cut to our pastry shop and got trapped for 20 minutes." Various doors to various passageways were locked, he said.

A man at the bar said, "I sure wish we had all this protection the night my suit was stolen from the parking lot."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



Secretary of State
William P. Rogers




Vice President
Agnew



PRESIDENT
NIXON



George A. Lincoln
Director of Office of
Emergency Preparedness




Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird

REVIEW GROUP

Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger. Members: Representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, of the C.I.A. Director and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others at the discretion of the chairman.

OFFICIALS



Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
Staff Sec. William Watts,
Staff of 38.

DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE

Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger.

Members: Elliot L. Richardson, David Packard, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Richard Helms, Robert P. Mayo, Budget Director, and Paul McCracken, Chairman of Council of Economic Advisers. Also participating when appropriate are Gerard Smith, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Lee A. DuBridge, Science Adviser to the President, and Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission.

AD HOC GROUPS

Appointed by the President as needed for particular problems. Now in existence:

VIETNAM STUDY GROUP
PANEL ON VERIFICATION OF ARMS

UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE



Chairman: Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State

Alternate: U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State

Members: Henry A. Kissinger, David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence Agency; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others at the discretion of the Chairman.

COUNTRY STUDY GROUPS

Interdepartmental teams concerned with policy toward individual countries.

continued

INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUPS

EAST ASIA



Chairman: Marshall Green,
Assistant
Secretary of State

MIDEAST



Chairman: Joseph J. Sisco,
Assistant
Secretary of State

EUROPE



Chairman: Martin J.
Hillenbrand,
Assistant
Secretary of State

AFRICA



Chairman: David D.
Newsom,
Assistant
Secretary of State

LATIN AMERICA



Chairman: Charles A.
Meyer,
Assistant
Secretary of State

Members of the Groups: Representatives of Henry A. Kissinger, Melvin R. Laird,
Richard Helms, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler and others at the discretion of the Chairmen.

The New York Times

This unofficial chart, based on the Nixon foreign-policy report and official sources, underlines the Kissinger role in the policy-making

pg. 19, 1970
process

25X1A

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DIARY NOTES

DD/S

19 February 1970

25X1A

* 1. [REDACTED] The DCI asked at the Executive Committee Meeting this morning the background of this deal. Apparently some congressmen are still confused as to what has taken place. It was suggested that the background of this be pulled together so we have all the facts in case any question comes up. From the Office of Finance Les Bush should pull up a memorandum reciting the activities that have developed and trace the action that has taken place so that it can be furnished to the Executive Director. (Mr. Coffey orally passed action to Mr. Bush.)

* * * * *

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
2. [REDACTED] Dr. Tietjen advised today that the IG was interested in this case and that Dr. Tietjen was to reply to him. It is possible that his experience in the Midcareer Course did have some bearing on his difficulties. Basically he seemed to be stimulated by this experience and since he is a restless driving type he appears to have pushed beyond normal his reaction to the Course. Basically he, for a number of reasons and well beyond the Midcareer Course, deprived himself of sleep both during the course and at home that weekend to the point where he departed from normality. He recovered very quickly.

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3. [REDACTED] left the Medical Staff about 8 months ago because of personal problems. He apparently has been experiencing some dillusions and has come to [REDACTED] to have him try to do something about these dillusions. He believes someone is bugging his house and is trying to get the Medics to offset it. The Medics will talk to him and try to eventually disassociate themselves from his problems.

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4. [REDACTED] He has been brought back from [REDACTED] for medical evaluation and will be shortly returned to his post in [REDACTED]. He is a driver and has pushed himself too heavily in an effort to prove his success as COS. Apparently he overdid this to some extent and has been advised and warned that he has got to take it easy and slow down.

RLB:llc

*Extract to D/F

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JAN	FEB	MAR - 1970 -	APR	MAY	JUNE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

LAST MONTH	1970 FEBRUARY 1970	NEXT MONTH
1970 JANUARY 1970		1970 MARCH 1970
S M T W T F S	S M T W T F S	S M T W T F S
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Wednesday **18** February

A. M. P. M.

8:45	1:00
9:00	1:15
9:15	1:30
9:30	1:45
9:45	2:00
10:00	2:15
10:15	2:30
10:30	2:45
10:45	3:00
11:00	3:15
11:15	3:30
11:30	3:45
11:45	4:00
12:00	4:15
12:15	4:30
12:30	4:45
12:45	5:00

MEMORANDA *Mr. Bannerman on Annual Leave*

SECRET EYES ONLY

B

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

A/DD/S

17 February 1970

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1. The morning meeting was relatively short. 25X1A
sat in for Mr. Godfrey, [REDACTED] for Mr. Karamessines
and [REDACTED] for Mr. Houston.

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2. I reported that [REDACTED] was in business even though
the office was a mess. I noted that they had electricity but no
heat, that their records had not been damaged and that all flights
were moving on time. The Director appreciated that it was good
to know that they were working in the tradition of the old Post Office.

3. There was some discussion by [REDACTED] of his
session yesterday with [REDACTED]. The Director remarked that it
was time that some people like [REDACTED] came out of the field and faced
the realities of the U. S. scene and its problems.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

25X1A

5. It was noted that the Director is to appear before the
Joint Atomic Energy Commission on 2 March 1970.

25X1A

6. The only substantive item was a note to the effect that
Messrs. [REDACTED] are making an extensive trip to Europe,
the Middle East and Africa and have asked for Agency briefing on
[REDACTED]. This is to take place from
9 a. m. to 11 a. m. on 20 February (and in the DD/S conference room
per arrangements made after the meeting). The Director assigned
primary briefing responsibility to the DD/I but asked all who have
an equity to be sure to surface it in good time. Apparently the

SECRET EYES ONLY

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET EYES ONLY
05/05 CIA R6 P0300

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briefing participants will be [REDACTED] who has made contact with Mr. [REDACTED] per the Director's desire and who is apparently in charge of arrangements, the DD/I briefer or briefers, Legislative Counsel and probably Mr. Bross or someone from NIPE. (After the meeting I mentioned to [REDACTED] that some decision will be required concerning briefing or not briefing them on the Agency's communication station in [REDACTED]. I asked him to mention this when he and [REDACTED] get together with the Director and finalize the items to be included in the briefing. I gathered that the briefing is somewhat of a quid offsetting [REDACTED] original idea to visit one of our sensitive sites in [REDACTED]. The Director definitely does not want them visiting either or both of these sites. After the meeting I also spoke with [REDACTED] mentioning to him that our station at [REDACTED] should be considered. He waived this off as being a DD/P concern saying that DD/I would present background only. I also spoke with [REDACTED] and asked if he would, through [REDACTED] make sure that the DD/P would consider a question of mentioning our [REDACTED] facility during the Friday session with Messrs. [REDACTED].

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JOHN [REDACTED]FFEY
Acting [REDACTED] Director
for Support

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

SECRET EYES ONLY

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DIARY NOTES

Acting DD/S

17 February 1970

25X1C

1. Both LSD and OC reported telephone problems which may be related to recent bad weather. LSD reported the White House DCI line and the DCI home to switchboard lines out -- the White House line was re-established before mid-morning, the home line by lunch time. OC had a number of Telephone Company lines used for traffic circuits which were down, cutting service to a number of overseas relay locations. While the trouble was being isolated and corrected, the [REDACTED] assisted in routing some of our encrypted traffic over their circuits to overseas relays. By mid-afternoon OC reported service restored. The nature of the difficulty has not been fully identified.

2. Mr. Osborn telephoned around noon to say that he was really not feeling very well and was putting himself on sick leave for the balance of the week. He apparently had some recurrence of his flu symptoms over the week-end. He had come in this morning to chair a Security Committee meeting and to talk to the Director about some unidentified items. I told him that we would certainly want him to take whatever time is necessary to get in shape and to get some medical assistance. Colonel White's Office was informed of his absence.

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3. [REDACTED] called attention to the CRITIC (copy attached) concerning the small arms, etc., attack on [REDACTED]

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4. Talked with [REDACTED] re SIDES. (See separate MFR.)

25X1A

[REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

6. [REDACTED] and I had a conversation with [REDACTED] (Jack Blake is still on sick leave) concerning the OL papers which constitute the OL response to our requirements for a month by month ceiling target and reduction plan in OL. We pointed out that we did not feel that OL should be relieved of the responsibility for complying with the directive to project through FY 1971 (in contrast to their current action of projecting only compliance with a 30 June 1970 on-board figure). We indicated our belief that you would not be satisfied with this partial compliance and our understanding that you had been explicit in telling Mr. Blake that he must meet his new ceilings. [REDACTED] will reflect these views to Mr. Blake

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but did express the opinion that Mr. Blake had gone over the content of the two papers with you when he saw you last Friday and his understanding that you were sympathetic to the positions raised.

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John [REDACTED] ffey

Att